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1. Introduction 
The traditional economic oncept of a competitive quilibrium 
of a private ownership economy as e. g. defined in Debreu's Theory 
of Value [6] is based on the assumptions that (1) the number of the 
participating firms in the market is fixed, (2) each firm follows the 
prescribed rule of maximizing profit at given prices, and (3) the per- 
centage share of each consumer in the profit of each firm is fixed. 
One possible justification of these assumptions i  that the underlying 
institutional structure of the market economy permits and/or im- 
poses a two step procedure. In the first step, all consumers who 
ultimately exercise control over all productive facilities decide prior 
to the opening of the market which productive facilities hall be used 
and how the profit of the selected producers are to be distributed. 
After such an agreement has been reached each participating producer 
is told to maximize his profit at the prevailing market price. Then, 
the market will open and all agents, consumers and producers, carry 
out their plans. 
Economically, assumptions (1) and (3) are rather restrictive. If 
the procedure of determining the features of (1) and (3) is of the above 
type, one would expect hat there exists some underlying structure 
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of ownership control over all productive facilities by the consumers. 
Since market prices are not known while consumers decide on the 
set of firms, at the final market equilibrium consumers may want to 
revise their original decision. This would lead to another ound of 
determining a set of firms and of profit shares which may result again 
in an unstable market structure at the new market equilibrium, since 
no real market information is available while the consumers decide 
on the set of firms and on the profit shares. In such a case it would 
be much more desirable to make the outcome of such a procedure 
part of the market mechanism. This way such phenomena s entry 
and exit of firms, i. e. the selection of profitable and efficient pro- 
duction facilities can be incorporated in the model as well as the 
determination of the final profit distribution in the market, which, 
if appropriately done, will reflect the ownership structure of the 
economy. This paper attempts to describe these phenomena for a 
typical private ownership economy, i. e. an economy in which all 
commodity resources are owned by consumers and in which con- 
sumers exercise control over all productive facilities. The following 
section contains the necessary conceptual extensions of the model by 
D ebreu. In section 3 a new equilibrium concept is defined and some 
preliminary results are given. Section 4 supplies a general existence 
theorem for such equilibria. 
2. The Model 
The consumption characteristics of a typical consumer i out of 
the set of consumers 1={1 . . . .  , n} are described by the triple 
(Xl, e,, ~),  i. e. his consumption set X,, a non-empty subset of the 
commodity space R ~, his preference relation ~,  and his endowment 
e, ~ RL 
The total set of producers or firms which may participate in the 
market will be denoted by J ,  a non-empty subset of the non-negative 
integers. Each firm j ~ J will be described by a production possibility 
set Y~, a non-empty subset of the commodity space RL Each firm is 
owned and controlled by some group of consumers S c I which implies 
that S decides whether its firm j participates in the market. In general 
a group of consumers S could control more than one firm or none 
at all. In the first case this would imply that S controls several sepa- 
rate productive units in the economy. Without too much loss of 
generality one may assume that these units can be combined into one 
firm, so that each group S owns at most one firm. For the opposite 
case in which a group of consumers does not own a firm, it will be 
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said for the purpose of the analysis that S owns a firm j with u ={0}, 
i. e. S owns a firm whose only activity consists of doing nothing. 
Finally, as a mathematical convention, the empty group of con- 
sumers will be said to own the firm j = 0 with Y0 = {0). Completing 
notational matters with these assumptions J will be the set 
{0, 1, . . . ,  2 n -  1} and, with an appropriate numbering of the groups 
of consumers, firm j will be owned by Sj, j ~ J .  Hence the economy 
may be described by the list ~={I,  (Xi), (el), (~), (Yj)}. 
The typical situation in the economy after the market opens will 
now be as follows. There will be a non-empty subset J c  J of firms 
which participate in the market. Once a firm has entered the market, 
i. e. its owners decided that their firm should produce, it will decide 
on some production plan and also on how its profits, at the given 
market price, will be divided among the consumers. It is always 
assumed that the actual decision-making within the firm is not costly 
and that it is independent of the consumption characteristics of its 
owners. If each firm j ~ J decides on a production plan yj ~ Y~, X yj 
iE! 
will be the aggregate supply of the productive sector. Let 0~j be the 
profit share of consumer i in firm j, where 0 _-< 01j _-< 1 and X 0r = 1 
1 i~I 
for j ~ J. Let P = {p ~ R~+] X pi = 1) denote the set of possible prices. 
i=1 
Then, by the convention of signs for the bundles yj E Yj, the scalar 
product p.y j  will be firm j's profit and consumer i will receive an 
amount of t~ = X O~j p.yj .  For the remaining analysis it is sufficient 
to consider the aggregate payments t~ which consumer i receives. 
Hence the actions of the productive sector in any market situation, 
i. e. if prices p prevail, are completely specified by the set Jove ,  
production bundles y~ ~ Yj, j ~ J, and profit payments tt ~ R 1, i ~ I. 
Definition: A triple [J, (yj), (t~)] is called a firm structure relative 
to prices p if 
(1) J c  vr 
(2) y~ ~ Y~, j E I 
(3) X p.y j= X t~ 
jEJ ieI 
One of the standard assumptions on the properties of the pro- 
duction possibility sets in general equilibrium theory is that 0 ~ Yj 
for all firms. It should be clear that with such an assumption a true 
distinction of whether a firm participates in the market or not is not 
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possible at all prices. This assumption would actually eliminate the 
economic problem of selecting profitable firms since any member of 
the all firm set could always avoid a loss at all prices and still remain 
in the market. On the other hand 0 r Yj seems to be the only way to 
allow for set-up costs or fixed costs of a firm within such a general 
framework of production. Since the non-exclusion of 0 r Yj is the 
only way to create situations in which some firm's maximal profit is 
negative, it is also the only possibility to distinguish firms according 
to their profitability. Due to the normalization of prices absolute 
profit levels are not a meaningful criterion. Hence, in a theory, which 
attempts to explain why not necessarily all firms will participate in 
the market at all prices, one has to use assumptions which may force 
a firm to shut down at certain prices. In what follows it will always 
be assumed that, for some firm j, 0 r Yj. 
3. Stable Firm Structures 
Since the ultimate control over productive facilities lies in the 
hands of the consumers, an equilibrium concept should take into 
account hat any group of consumers which is dissatisfied with its 
profit payments from a given firm structure and which could actually 
achieve higher payments for all of its members from its own firm, 
will always bargain for at least the maximum profit from its own 
firm. This argument provides the basis for the following definition. 
Definition: A list [J, (yj), (tl)] is called a stable firm structure 
relative to prices p if 
(1) [J, (yj), (ti)] is a firm structure relative to prices p, 
(2) t~ _>- 0 for all i e I 
(3) X t~=>sup {p.y[ y ~ Yj} for all SjcI. 
i~sj 
The definition of a stable firm structure and its interpretation 
describe the production sector of a market economy. All production 
decisions are decentralized and made by the individual firm. Although 
the ultimate control over the available production possibilities is 
exercised by consumers their influence is only traceable with regard 
to their desire to achieve a high income level In this respect the defi- 
nition guarantees a certain "maximal" income to each consumer 
relative to his ownership of productive facilities. On the other hand, 
the definition allows for free entry and exit of all possible firms using 
only minimal assumptions on the cooperation among consumers to 
guarantee actual participation of any firm. Combining the feature 
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that each consumer maximizes his preference relation subject o his 
income with the above concept yields the following notion of equi- 
librium. 
Definition: A list [(~,), J, (~j), (F,), ~] is a market equilibrium with 
a stable firm structure if
(1) xt maximizes ~. in the budget set 
{xr e X~[p. x~ =< p. er + re} for all i e I 
(2) [J, (~j), (~r is stable at 
(3) Z~= Z e~ + X ~j. 
i~I i~l j~J 
Thus an equilibrium has the two main properties that no group 
of consumers through independent action can increase its total in- 
come and no consumer can achieve a higher level of satisfaction 
using his own income. The concept represents a generalization of the 
usual competitive equilibrium. In fact, one can show under tradition- 
al assumptions that, for an economy where all firms have been 
formed, the competitive quilibrium is also one with a stable firm 
structure if each firm distributes profits only to its owners. In general, 
however, the concept is independent of any behavioral assumption 
for firms; in particular, profit maximization of firms will in general 
not be present at the equilibrium point. 
There exists a second relationship between stable firm structures 
and competitive behavior of firms which is stated in the following 
lemma. 
Lernma 1: Let [], (y~) (tO] be a stable firm structure relative to p 
such that the set J defines a partition o[ I, i. e., for any j' and j" con- 
tained in J, Sj, c3Sj,,=4, and u Sj=I. Then for all j e J, 
(1) p 'y j=Max {p'yJy ~ Yj) 
(2) 27 t~ = p. y~. 
i~s~ 
Proof: Consider the partition {S~}. The stability implies that for 
all j e J, 
x t~ >Max {P'YlY ~ YJ}>P'Y~. 
% 
Hence 
Xp.y j= Xt~=X Xt~> Xp.y j  
i~J i~x i~y i~sj j~y 
which yields (1) and (2). Q .E .D .  
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Finally, if the ownership structure for the firms in the market 
economy is interpreted in the sense of a coalition production economy 
(see e. g. [2] and [8]) one obtains the following result. 
Lemma 2: Let [(~), J, (~j), (tO, P] be a mart~et equilibrium with 
a stable firm structure. Then (-xr is an allocation in the core. 
Proo[: Suppose the statement were false. Then there would exist 
a non-empty coalition Si which could block (x0, i. e., there exist 
(x~), i ~ Sj, y e Yj such that 
(1) xr  iES~ 
(2) Xx~= Xe l+y.  
i~Sj ieSj 
Yet (1) implies ~" xi > ~" e, + ~,, i e S~. Hence 
-~. Xe ,+~.y>~.  Xe,+ X~i>ff 9 S e ,+Max {~.yly e Yj} 
i~sj i~sj iosj i~sj 
implying 
~.y>Max (P'YIY E Yj} 
which is a contradiction. Q .E .D .  
4. Existence of Equilibria with Stable Firm Structures 
This section contains a main existence theorem the proof of which 
is a straightforward extension of the existence proof for competitive 
equilibria given byDebreu  in [6]. His notation and definitions will 
be followed as closely as possible. The major differences between 
D ebreu's proof and the one presented here are a consequence of the 
different equilibrium concept. Since his method of proof is only 
directly applicable to an economy with a fixed set of firms where 
each firm can always produce at a non-negative profit, it was neces- 
sary to find a procedure which determines a set of firms and supply 
bundles at each price. More precisely, for every price a stable firm struc- 
ture had to be found. The crucial argument is taken directly from the 
definition of a stable firm structure which has an immediate inter- 
pretation as a solution of a side-payment game for each price. Its 
core defined in an appropriate way yields the necessary continuity 
property of the payoffs to show existence of an equilibrium. Lemma 1 
represents he crucial step. It also supplies the basic argument for the 
construction of the set of firms, defined for each price by the dual 
variables of a linear program, which is an application of the result 
on cores of balanced games. 
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Definition: A set of firms J is called balanced if the collection of 
coalitions controlling J is a balanced family, i. e. if there exist weights 
dj > 0, j ~ J, such that 
X dj = 1 for all i e I. 
sj~i 
Let Y= to X Yj denote the aggregate production possibility set. 
.1r i~J 
Theorem: 
Let the economy ~ be described by 
~={I,  (X,), (e,), (~.), (Yj)}. 
Then ~ has a market equilibrium with a stable firm structure if for 
all i e I 
(C1) X~ c R 1 is closed, convex, and bounded from below, 
(C2) i is locally not satiated, 
(C3) ~ is a complete, transitive, and continuous preordering on 
i 
Xt such that the set {x~ e X~]x~  x(} is convex for every 
Xi' ff X G 
(C4) there exists xd ~ X~ such that xi~ 
0 ~ Yj for & = {i} for all i e I 
Yj is closed for all j e d r 
Y is closed 
Yn ( -  Y) c {0} 
YDR[ 
every balanced set of firms J and weights (dj) 
(P6) Xd jY jc  XYj 
i~I jEJ 
(P7) 27 u is convex. 
i~J 
Assumptions (Cl)--(C4) are standard for any existence proof in 
general equilibrium theory. On the production side (P2)--(PS) are 
the appropriate generalizations of the assumptions usually made in 
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consumer will be non-negative. (P6) and (P7) describe a specific 
ownership distribution and a specific separation of the total pro- 
ductive possibilities for which it seems difficult to give a direct and 
complete conomic interpretation or characterization in terms of the 
individual sets Yj. However, as the following two examples demon- 
strate, assumptions (P6) and (P7) describe many typical cases includ- 
ing the traditional model with 0 e Ys for every firm as well as situa- 
tions in which firms have set-up costs. 
Clearly, 0 E Yj for all j a J and (P7) imply (P6) since 
X d~ Yj c X conv Yj = Z' Yj. 
i~J i~1 i~Y 
On the other hand, consider an economy in which "most" of the 
firms have the same convex cone as production possibility set. If the 
remaining firms are controlled by disjoint, proper subsets of I which 
do not form a partition of I and if their production possibility sets 
are any arbitrary subsets of this cone then (P6) and (P7) will hold. 
Definition: The set of attainable states of the economy r is an 
(n + 1)-list of vectors (xl , . . . ,  xn, y) e R l (~+1) such that for all i e I, 
x~ ~ X~, y e Y, and X x~ = X e~ + y. 
iel ieI 
Proo/: First, one observes that (C1), (P3)--(P5) imply that the 
set of attainable states of the economy is closed and bounded 
(Debreu [6], Theorems 1 and 2, p. 77). Hence, most arguments can 
be carried out in a well-chosen compact cube in the commodity space 
(Debreu [6], proof of Theroem 1, p. 83). Let Kz be a closed cube 
of R t with center at the origin containing in its interior the set of all 
attainable consumption and production plans. For i ~I, define 
X~I = X~ nK1 and for Sjc [, define yjl= yj nK1. Following Debreu  
one can show the existence of an equilibrium for the economy 
~I={I,  (X~nK1), (e~), (~.), (YjnK1)). Although any equilibrium 
will be contained in this truncated economy, one cannot conclude 
that any equilibrium with a stable firm structure for ~1 is also an 
equilibrium with a stable firm structure for ~. Therefore, an increas- 
ing sequence of cubes Kq with the associated truncated economies 
Cq will be constructed, where Kq becomes infinitely large. Arguments 
similar to the ones used by D ebreu ([4], Section 3) and by H i lden-  
b rand  ([9], proof of Theorem 2) will then establish that there exists 
an equilibrium for the unrestricted economy ~. 
The proof will now be carried out in several steps Let 
vj(p) =Max (P'yly ~ YJ nK1}, j ~ J 
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Lemma 1: If for all j ~ J ,  u is compact, non-empty and if for 
j e J ,  such that Sj = {i}, 0 e Yj, then for each p e P there exists a 
payoff vector h e R% h >= O, and a generalized characteristic vector 
d e R 2~, 0 =< d 5 1, such that 
(1) Xh~>=vj(p) fo ra l lSsc I  
% 
(2) x hi = ~ djvj(p) 
iel ie~" 
(3) X dj = 1 for all i e I. 
s~i 
Proof: Since yj l  is compact, vj(p) exists for all j at any p. In 
particular, vj(p) >0, Sj = {i}. Denote by ej e R n the characteristic 
vector of coalition Sj, i. e., (ej)i--1, if i e Sj, and zero otherwise; and 
e 6 = (0, . . . .  0). Let E = (ej) be the matrix of all 2 ~ vectors. Arranging 
the elemems in I and E in the appropriate order, one can rewrite (1) as 
Eh > v(p). 
Consider the following linear program and its dual. 
Primal: Min X hi 
iE1 
Subject o Eh ~ v(p) 
Dual: Max d. v(p) 
Subject o dE=l  d>0. 
1 denotes a vector of appropriate dimension each element of which 
is equal to one. 
Since v(p) is finite both problems are feasible. Then, by standard 
duality arguments, both have optimal solutions (d*, b*) such that 
d*'v(p) = X h~*. 
Hence (d*, h*) satisfy (1), (2), and (3). Q .E .D .  
Clearly, for a given p, d* and h* wilt not be unique. Define 
~(p) = {did a solution of the dual at p} 
z(p) = {hIh a solution of the primal at p}. 
Then Lemma 1 states that ~(p) #~ and T(p) #~. 
Lemma 2: If yjl  is compact for all j ~ J ,  then ~ and 9 are upper 
bemi-continuous and convex valued correspondences, and 9 admits 
a continuous election. 
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Proo[: y~l compact implies that v(p) is a continuous function. 
The dual as the following maximization problem 
H(p) =Max {d.v(p) I dE=l ,  d>O} 
yields (~ upper hemi-continuous by standard maximization results 
since d.v(p) is a continuous function from (dldE=l,  d>=O)• into 
R and (dldE=l,  d>=O) is trivially continuous in p. Let d 1 e #(p) and 
d 2 ~ #(p) and 0 <1 < 1. Then 2d 1 + (1-2)  d 2 ~{d[dE = 1, d > 0}, ~ con- 
vex set. Furthermore, d1. v(p) = d 2. v(p) implies [2d 1 + (1 - 2) d2] 9 v(p) 
=2dl.v(p) +(1-2)  d2.v(p)=dl.v(p). Hence, 6(p) is convex valued. 
Similarly, for the primal, one knows that fl(p) = {h[Eh > v (p) } is convex 
valued. Take h 1 e fl(p), h 2 E fl(p). Then E [2h l+(1-2)h~]= 
2Eh ~ + (1-2) Eh 2 >2v(p) + (1-2)  v(p) = v(p). 
Furthermore, from the duality property, the objective function 
of the primal is continuous in p since H(p) = {h" 1 I h ~ r(p)) where 
H(p) was shown to be continuous. Hence 9 maps P into some com- 
pact subset of R ~. For ~ to be upper hemi-continuous, it is sufficient 
to show that its graph is closed. Consider pn ~ p, h n ~ h, h~er(pn). 
Then the continuity of H(p) and h ~ er(pn) implies h. l=H(p) .  
Hence h e~(p). To show convexity, let h 1 e~(p) and h2er(p). 
Then [2h 1 + (1-1)  h2] 9 1 =2h 1.1 + (1-2)  h 2.1 =h 1-1. 
It remains to be shown that ~ admits a continuous selection. 
Consider the following linear program 
Min hi 
Subject to Eh >= v(p) 
1. h <= H(p). 
Clearly, the feasible set for this program is r(p), a non-empty, com- 
pact, and convex subset of R ~ of dimension at most equal to n -1 ,  
which implies that the program has an optimal solution. Let 
and 
[l(p) =Min  {hi t Eh > v(p), 1 .h <=H(p)} 
Using the same arguments as before for the correspondence 3, it 
follows immediately that [1 is a continuous function, 31 is upper 
hemi-continuous, and ~l(p) is non-empty, compact, and of dimension 
at most n -2 .  Proceeding in the same fashion, define for i =2 . . . .  , n 
[~(p) = Min {h~l Eh >= v(p), 1. h < H (p), e(~-k}" h <= [~-k(p), t~ = 1,. . .  ,i - 1} 
Firms and Market Equilibria in a Private Ownership Economy 97 
and 
~i(p) ={h ] Eh>v(p), 1.h~H(p),  e(i-k}'h <=[~-~(p), ~=1, . . . ,  i - l ,  
=f, (p)} 
={h]h  ~ z,-l(p), e~t}'h=b(p)}. 
Clearly, for all i=2, . . . .  n, h is continuous, ~-r is non-empty, com- 
pact, of dimension at most equal to Max {0, n- i} ,  and ~l is upper 
hemi-continuous. In particular, ~(p) will be the unique point [[1 (p), 
9 ..,/n(p)]. Since rn is upper hemi-continuous the function g:P --* R n 
defined by g(p)=[/l(p),..., fn(p)] is continuous and for all p e P, 
g(p) ~ r(p). Q. E. D. 
Let Fj(p)={~j ~ yjl ]p'yj=vj(p)}. Under assumption (P2) Fj(p) 
is non-empty and ~j is upper hemi-continnous. For each p ~ P and 
d e (~(p) define a supply correspondence 
~(d, p) = X dj Fj(p) 
Since the strictly positive components of d define a balanced set J(d) 
it follows that ~(d, p)= X djFdp), d e ~(p). Now define as the 
ieJCd) 
aggregate supply correspondence 
F(p)=conv u ~(d,p) 
where cony denotes convex hull9 
Lemma 3: I[ u is compact and non-empty, and i[ (P6) and (P7) 
hold, then ~(p) is non-empty, ~7 is an upper hemi-continuous cor- 
respondence, and y ~ ~(p) implies 
(1) p.y=H(p),  
(2) there exists a set J c jr  such that y ~ X Yj. 
ieJ 
Proo[: The non-emptiness follows from Lemma 1 and from the 
definition of ~(p). 
Let y ~ ~/(d, p), i. e. y = 2: d j~ where (dj) e ~(p) and ~j e ~j(p). 
IE~ 
Then 
p.y =p. X df~j = X djp'yj= X d~v~(p) =H(p) 
i~  i~  i~  
which proves (1), since the same argument can be used for any finite 
convex combination of points in u ~(d, p). 
deS(d) 
To prove (2) one uses the fact that with each element in ~(d, p) 
is associated a balanced set J(d). Let y e ~/(p). Then y can be written 
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as a convex combination of at most /+1 vectors y~7(d~,p) ,  
l+1 l+1 
~:=1,. . . ,  l+1, i.e., y=X2~y~ with 0<1~-<1 and X ik=l .  Let 
k=l k=l 
jk be the balanced set associated with d k and let yj~ ~ ~j(p) be such 
that y~ = S dj~)r Then 
ieJ lc 
1+1 /+1 1+1 
y = X i~y ~ = X t ~: X d~y j  ~ = X X ;t~d~:y~ .
k = 1 k= 1 i~jtc ~= 1 ie]~ 
1+1 
First one observes that J = u J~ is a balanced set which is defined 
k=l 
by the positive components of the associated vector of weights 
y = X 2~d e. Clearly, y ~ ~(p) according to Lemma 2. Furthermore, 
k=l 
1+1 
X Xted~y~= X X2ed~y~ ~ 
k=l  i~jlc i~J I~ 
J l% i 
~ d~ ~ 
= X X ( X ).~d~ ) 1?it, d./~ y~ 
i ~ ] I~ k k 
jl% i Jl%i jl% i 
= X ?,~ X ~,~ y~ ~ 2; 7~ conv Y~ 
j~J k i~J ]k~j 
= 2; conv yj Yj =conv S yj Yt c X Yj 
i~J iel i~J 
where the last inclusion follows from (P6) and (P7). Hence y ~ X Yj 
which proves (2). 
The upper hemi-continuity of ~7 will be shown in two steps. First, 
it will be demonstrated that ~(p)= u ~/(d, p) is upper hemi-con- 
dc-d(p) 
tinuous. 
Since for all p and all d ~ ~(p), ~(d, p) is bounded it suffices to 
show that u ~(d, ?) has a closed graph. Consider sequences 
dc~(p) 
y '~y ,  p~p such that y~ u ~(d,p~). Then there exist se- 
dc~(p n) 
quences d ~ ~ d and ynj ~ yj for every ] ~ J such that d n E ~(pn) 
and yn~ ~ ~j (p~), i ~ J -  Since for every ] ~ J ,  ~j and ~ have a closed 
graph, it follows that yj ~ ~j(p), j ~ ~ and d ~ ~(p). Hence 
y = X djyj  ~ ~(d, p) c u ~(d, p). 
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It remains to be shown that F(p) has a closed graph. Let # be 
any correspondence b  : P ~ Y, yc  R z and Y compact, and assume 
that # has a closed graph. Consider sequences zn ~ z, pn__~ p, 
z n e conv be(pn). Then there exist sequences z~ n --~ z/~, 2/A ~ 2k for 
l+ l  l+1 
/~ = 1, . . . ,  l + 1 with 0 _-< 2~n < 1 and X 2k n = 1 such that z n = X 2enz~ n
k=l  k=l  
and zk n ~ be(pn). Since be has a closed graph it follows that ze s #(p) 
l+ l  
for every /~=l , . . . , l+ l  and clearly X2e=l  with 0<2~<1 for 
l-}-I k= l  
k=l , . . . ,  l+1. Hence X 2eze e convbe(p), which completes the 
proof of Lemma 3. 
Let griP), i=1 , . . . ,  n be the i-th component of the continuous 
selection g(p)~ z(p), i. e., consumer i's profit payment. Then his 
budget correspondence fl~ can be defined as 
fl~(p) = {x~ ~ X~ c~K1 I P" x~ < p. e~ + gl (p) }. 
Lemma 4: I[ (CI) ,  (C4), and (PI) bold and if yj1 is compact,  then 
fl~ is lower hemi-cont inuous at every p and has a closed graph. 
Proo[: (C4), (P1), and Lemma 2 imply that, for all p e P, fli(p) is 
non-empty. Let xi n ~ x~, p~ ~ p, and for all n, x~ n E flt(pn). Hence, 
pn'x l~<p~'e~q-gi (p~) and the continuity on both sides imply 
p" x~ < p. e~ + gt(p), i. e. x~ e fl~(p). 
Let x~ ~ fl~(p) and pn ~ p. According to (C4) and since g~(p) >0, 
p. x~ ~ < p.e~ +gi(p). Consider the straight line L passing through xi ~ 
and x~ and let a n ~ L be such that pn'an=p~'e~+g~(pn) .  Define 
a n if p~'an<pn 'x~ 
Xi  n 
I x~, otherwise 
Clearly, x~ n -* xi and, also, x~ n e fl~(pn) for all n. Hence, fll is lower 
hemi-continuous. Q .E .D .  
Let the demand correspondence 8~of each consumer i be defined 
by 8~(p)={x~ fl~(p) [ xi ,~ z~ for all z~ e fl~(p)}. 
Lemma 5: Let (C1)-- (C4) be satisfied. Then 8~(p) is non-empty 
and convex, and the correspondence 8~ is upper hemi-continuous. 
Proo[: Since X~ nK1 is compact, fldP) is compact. According to 
Lemma 4, fl~ is a continuous correspondence. Since ~. is a complete 
preorder there exists a maximal element in fl~(p), hence 8~(p) is 
non-empty. 
7* 
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Let xi' e 81(p) and xr ~ 81(p). For any 0<2<1,  2x l '+(1-2)  
x~" ~ fli(p). Furthermore, by the convexity of ~ ,  2xt' + (1-2) xi" .~ 
x~' which implies 2x~' + (1 -~) x(' ~ 8~(p). 
For 8~ to be upper hemi-continuous, it suffices to show that 8~ 
has a closed graph. Let x~ ~ --* x~, p~ --* p, and x~ n e 8~(pn). Clearly, 
x~ e fl~(p). Since fl~ is lower hemi-continuous, for every z e fl~(p) 
there exists a sequence z ~ -~ z and z ~ ~ fl~(p~). Hence, x~ n ~ z" for 
i 
all n and by the continuity of ~ ,  x~ ~ z for all z e fl~(p), implying 
i i 
that 8~ is upper hemi-continuous. Q.E.D. 
Let 8(p) = X 8~(p) and define the excess demand correspondence 
iEI 
as 
r =8(p) - X et-~/(p) 
iel 
which is non-empty, convex, and upper hemi-continuous. ~ maps P 
into some compact subset Z of R 1. 
Following standard arguments of equilibrium analysis, define a 
correspondence # by #(z)--{p e P [ p ' z=Max P'z}. Clearly, #(z) is 
non-empty and convex, and # is upper hemi-continuous. Now let ~0 
be the correspondence d fined by ~(z, p)=8(p)• ~0 is a map 
from Z x P into itself. Furthermore, ~is upper hemi-continuous and 
~v(p) is non-empty and convex. Applying Kakutani 's  Fixed Point 
Theorem, there exists a (z 1, pl) such that (z z, p l )e  ~(z 1, pl), i. e. 
z 1 e ~(pl) and pl E #(zl). It remains to be shown that z 1 _-< 0. For any 
p ~P and zE~(p), i .e.  xeS(p) and ye~(p) ,  z=x-  Xe~-y ,  
iel 
p 'z=p 'x -p"  X e~-p .y<=g(p) . l -H(p)  =0. Hence in particular, 
i~I 
p l . z l  <=0. Since pl e #(zl), p.z l  <=pZ.zX <=0 for all p ~ P implies z 1 _-<0. 
Since each consumer is locally not satiated, p l .x l l=p l .e l+g~(p l )  
which implies p l . z  1 =0. Hence it has been shown that there exists 
a list [(x~l), j1, (yjl), (til), pl] where j1 is determined according to 
Lemma 3, and t~l=g~(pl), i ~ I. By construction [j1, (yjl), (t~l)] is 
stable relative to p~. Furthermore, for each i e I, x~ 1 is a best element 
in the restricted budget set, and market excess demand isnon-positive. 
Now consider an increasing sequence (Kq)q=l .... of closed cubes 
in R ~ with center at the origin and whose diameters tend to infinity. 
With each Kq associate the truncated economy ~q. Thus, for every 
q=l , . . . ,  there exists a list [(xtq), (yjq), p% (ttq), dq] such that 
(1) dq determines the set of firms jq, 
Firms and Market Equilibria in a Private Ownership Economy 101 
(2) for every i e I 
x~ ~ X~ ~Kq and x~ >- x~q implies pq" x~ > pq. e~ + t~q, 
i 
(3) [Jq, (y~q), (t~q)] is a firm structure relative to pq, i. e. 
X t~q = 27 pq" y~q, 
ieI j~]q 
(4) for every S~ = I 
t~q > Max {pq. y ] y ~ Y~ r3Kq}, 
i~sj 
(5) Z (x~q- e~) - Z yjq <= O. 
ieI jeJq 
By the choice of K1 and since Kx ~ Kq for all q = 1, . . . ,  one knows, 
that for all i ~ I, x~q ~ int Kx , t~q > O, X y~q ~ int K~ , 0 <= dq _-< 1. Hence 
i~ ]q 
the sequences (x~q)q=l . . . .  and (ysq)q=x . . . .  are hounded as well as 
(t~q) since (pq)q=l . . . .  is hounded and td  =g~(pq). Thus, there exists a 
converging subsequence with limit point [(~), (y~), p, (t~), d]. Clearly, 
~ ~ X~, ~ ~ Y~, t-~ > 0, p ~ P, and 0 < ct < 1. Furthermore, 
X(~t-e~)- X~j<0and X t l= X p .y j  
ieI j~  i~l j~ 
where ] is the set of firms determined by d. 
Suppose the firm structure [], (yj), t~] were not stable relative 
to ft. Then there exists a coalition St and a bundle y' e Yj such that 
if- y' > X t~. Clearly, for q large enough y' E Yj  nKq  and 
i~sj 
pq. y' > X t~q > Max {pq. y [ y ~ Yj nKq} 
i~sj 
which contradicts (4). 
Let z~ e Xi, z~ # x~ such that ~ "z~ < p" e~ +t~. There exists a sequence 
(ziq)q=l,... converging to z~ such that pq.z~ q <= pq. ei + td and 
zd  ~ X~ nKq. Since for all q =1 . . . .  x iq~ zd  the continuity of ~. 
implies ~ ~. zi. Hence, ~ is a best element in the unrestricted 
budget set. 
It remains to be shown that ~ supports an equilibrium with zero 
excess demand. Since each consumer is locally not satiated, we have 
for all i ~ I, p "x~ =p 'e i  +t-t, which implies ~. ( X (x l -e~) -  X ~j)= 0. 
ieI j~  
If ~>>0, then p. [ X (Y~ - e~) - X ~j] < ~- [ X (Y~ - e~) - 27 ~j] = 0 and 
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Z' (~-e~) -  27 ~j < 0 implies that excess demand is equal to zero. 
i~ I j~  
If ff contains ome zero component, then the assumption of free disposal 
guarantees that there exist bundles ~j' such that ft. 27 ~j'=lg- S ~j 
iQ iQ 
and 27 (xt -e~) -  27 ~j' =0. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
i~l i~J 
Q.E .D .  
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